MacIntyre, Dante and Modernity by Corbett, George
  
1 
MacIntyre, Dante and Modernity 
 
 John Haldane suggests two fresh ways in which modern scholars might engage with 
medieval thinkers.1 Where the goal of historical research is to understand ‘medieval thinkers, just as 
one might figures and ideas from other periods of the history of philosophy’, one may transcend the 
potential closure of history through comparative or practising research.2 The goal of comparative 
research is to explore parallels between ‘medieval and contemporary theories [...] in the hope of 
illuminating both sides of the comparison’; the goal of practising research is to ‘carry on 
philosophising in the general tradition of the scholastics’.3 In this comparative (and rather 
experimental) article, I first explore the important role which Alasdair MacIntyre assigns to Dante 
in his influential account of modern ethical theory and practice, an account which includes the 
provocative assertion that ‘moral enquiry can only extend itself by drawing upon Aquinas and upon 
Dante’.4 I critique two major claims which MacIntyre makes about Dante, and argue that Dante will 
not fit into the philosophical-historical genealogy which MacIntyre’s project outlines. In the second 
part, I attempt a comparison in the opposite direction. Instead of trying to draw out from Dante’s 
work what might be useful in supporting a contemporary philosophical standpoint (such as 
MacIntyre’s), I explore what might happen if we were to ask Dante to read us moderns. Leaving 
aside the incalculable historical, cultural and aesthetic value of Dante’s poem, may it speak 
philosophically only to those with essentially Christian-Aristotelian commitments? Or is there, in 
addition, a place in Dante’s poem for a philosophical attitude that might approximate to the secular 
materialism characteristic of modernity? I suggest that Dante’s nuanced treatment of Epicureanism 
may offer just such a prophetic analogue.5  
 
 
A Modern Philosopher and a Medieval Poet 
 
 MacIntyre’s use of Dante, which he does not himself fully develop, is at first sight 
appealing: here is a highly influential and much-cited philosopher offering to Dante scholars a 
                                                 
1 John Haldane, ‘Current Engagements’, in P. J. Fitzpatrick and John Haldane, ‘Medieval philosophy in later thought’. 
in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, ed. by A.S.McGrade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), pp. 300-27 (pp. 316-24).  
2 Ibid., pp. 321-22. 
3 Ibid., p. 321. However, Haldane calls for a ‘synthesis [of these approaches] analogous to that achieved by the 
medievals themselves’, a synthesis made possible, he suggests, by considering the way that the medievals combined 
more effectively ‘the scientific and sapiential dimensions of philosophy’ (p. 324).  
4 Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2006; first published 1990), p. 80.  
5 In his genealogy of secularization, Charles Taylor suggests that an ‘exclusive humanism was undoubtedly available 
[...] in Epicureanism’ but he explicitly excludes such a worldview as ‘virtually impossible’ before 1500 (let alone in 
1300!) See Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 27; pp. 374-76.  
  
2 
pivotal role for their medieval protagonist in modern ethical debate and practice.6 MacIntyre makes 
two substantive claims for the potential importance of Dante for his own philosophical project: first, 
that Dante’s Commedia shows in narrative practice what MacIntyre calls ‘the traditional version of 
moral enquiry’; secondly, that the narrative inclusiveness of Dante’s Commedia allows for, and 
therefore defeats, rival and divergent versions of moral enquiry within its dominant tradition-based 
narrative. 
 MacIntyre champions Dante as ‘the philosopher par excellence of the practical life’. He 
claims that a modern recuperation of traditional Aristotelian moral enquiry requires some recourse 
to Dante.7 In his view, to understand Aristotelian ethics is to understand the social context which 
made possible the exercise and celebration of the Aristotelian virtues. In a modernity in which such 
a social context has been eroded, we should read, alongside St Thomas Aquinas (as the foremost 
neo-Aristotelian philosopher), Dante who, through his narrative poetry, may show us what this 
ethical theory involves in narrative practice:  
 
In moral enquiry we are always concerned with the question: what type of enacted narrative would 
be the embodiment, in the actions and transactions of actual social life, of this particular theory? For 
until we have answered this question about a moral theory we do not know what that theory in fact 
amounts to; we do not as yet understand it adequately. And in our moral lives we are each engaged 
in enacting our own narrative, so revealing implicitly, and sometimes also explicitly, the not always 
coherent theoretical stance presupposed by that enactment.8 
 
Dante exemplifies, for MacIntyre, what is missing in a modern ethical discourse ‘blind to the 
complementary character of narrative and theory both in moral enquiry and in the moral life itself’.9  
 MacIntyre, however, goes further still: he contends that Dante’s work and philosophical 
procedure may provide a non-theoretical way out of the ‘moral incommensurability’ which is the 
characteristic feature of contemporary ethical debate:  
 
So the encyclopaedic, the genealogical, and the Thomistic tradition-constituted standpoints confront 
one another not only as rival moral theories but also as projects for constructing rival forms of 
moral narrative. Is there any way in which one of these rivals might prevail over the others? One 
possible answer was supplied by Dante: that narrative prevails over its rivals which is able to 
include its rivals within it, not only to retell their stories as episodes within its story but to tell the 
story of the telling of their stories as such episodes.10 
 
                                                 
6 Alasdair MacIntyre directly cites Dante at the following places: After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 2006; first 
published 1981), pp. 176; 243; Three Rival Versions, pp. 61; 80-1; 142-5; 147; 164; 197; 203. The only other reflection 
on MacIntyre’s treatment of Dante, as far as I am aware, is found in Robin Kirkpatrick and George Corbett, ‘“E lascia 
pur grattar...” Language, Narrative and Ethics in the Commedia’, in Dante the Lyric and Ethical Poet, ed. by Zygmunt 
G. Barański and Martin McLaughlin (Oxford: Legenda, 2010), pp. 56-71.  
7 MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, p. 80. 
8 Ibid., p. 80.  
9 Ibid., p. 80. 
10 Ibid., pp. 80-1. 
  
3 
MacIntyre leaves this claim hanging, however, as he writes that ‘we cannot hope even to pose the 
question of how Dante’s standard might be fruitfully applied without first elaborating an adequately 
full account of the Thomistic understanding of moral enquiry’.11 Let us, though, briefly consider it 
here. The first part of MacIntyre’s claim seems, although contentious, straightforward: that Dante’s 
master-narrative, the Commedia, includes within it rival moral theories under the aspect of rival 
moral narratives. It is less easy to grasp the second part of his claim. He writes that the poem does 
not just include these rival moral narratives (‘their stories’) within it as ‘episodes within its story’, 
but it tells ‘the story of the telling of their stories as such episodes’. The thrust of the claim as a 
whole, nonetheless, is clear. MacIntyre’s idea is that the master moral narrative of Dante’s poem 
includes within it rival moral theories (constructed as rival moral narratives). In so doing, it may be 
seen to ‘prevail over the others’, asserting its own superiority and claim on the reader’s assent.  
 MacIntyre’s second major claim about Dante’s poem must be understood within his vision 
of the history of philosophy. In MacIntyre’s simplified schema, the contemporary melange and 
heterodoxy of moral claims arises out of one historical conjunction: the Enlightenment’s rejection 
of the moral teleology intrinsic to the Aristotelian ethical tradition. In the ‘tradition’ project, whose 
greatest protagonist is Aristotle, virtues guide man from ‘man-as-he-happens-to-be’ to ‘man-as-he-
could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos’. The Enlightenment project, however, rationally defends virtues 
only in relation to ‘man-as-he-happens-to-be’. Rationalists, such as Kant, justify morality and 
produce the evaluative concepts of ‘rights’ in relation to the dictates of instrumental reason. 
Utilitarians, such as Bentham and Mill, set up a new social teleology, the happiness of the greatest 
number, producing the contemporary normative values of ‘utility’ and ‘equity’. But, deriving from 
different ethical foundations and criteria, these evaluative conclusions will always be 
incommensurable: 
 
[...] when claims involving rights are matched against claims appealing to utility or when either or 
both are matched against claims based on some traditional concept of justice, it is not surprising that 
there is no rational way of deciding which type of claim is to be given priority.12  
 
The consequence is relativism and emotivism: with no accepted ethical standard, all moral 
arguments are, as Nietzsche espoused, nothing but (more or less concealed) expressions of 
individual preference.  
 Denying to traditional reason an ontological privilege, MacIntyre seeks nevertheless to steer 
moral debate out of relativism and to advocate ‘traditional’ ethics through his emphasis on narrative 
form and on sociological praxis. MacIntyre is surely correct to demand that a moral philosopher 
                                                 
11 Ibid., p. 81.  
12 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 70. 
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account for the practical manifestation of an ethical theory. As ethics is a practical subject, in the 
sense that it manifests itself in human actions, so a moral theory must be more than a series of 
propositions – it must be ‘true to life’.13 As Martha Nussbaum’s parallel literary defence of broadly 
Aristotelian ethics highlights, if a moral theory cannot be conceived in the particular of human lives 
(and thus shown in historical or fictional narratives) how may it be justified as a human moral 
theory at all?14 MacIntyre is similarly right to emphasise the importance, in Aristotelian ethics, of a 
well-governed social context and normative social roles for the efficacious schooling in and 
flourishing of virtue. 
 MacIntyre’s exaggerated emphases on narrative and sociology, however, lead to major 
problems in any comparative analysis with Dante. MacIntyre relativises historically the Thomistic-
Aristotelian philosophy he avowedly champions into an ever-evolving tradition in which rival 
ethical views may be, more or less successfully, accommodated over time.15 MacIntyre’s analysis 
of the papal encyclicals Veritatis Splendor (1992) and Fides et Ratio (1998) is symptomatic of his 
procedural insistence on the relativisation of natural reason within a particular moral community.16 
Although it is true that, in his later works, MacIntyre retracts his earlier repudiation of 
‘metaphysical biology’, even his more recent work insists on a vindication of traditional ethics in 
terms of a comparative critique of rival theories.17 Drawing upon the empirical evidence of 
professional and lay intractable disagreement in ethics, MacIntyre does not consider sustainable the 
view that the precepts of natural law might be rationally binding in the same way as, for example, 
                                                 
13 MacIntyre’s contribution to the rehabilitation of Aristotelian ethics within the academy is inestimable, but this should 
not sideline his achievement in translating into modern terminology, and with popular every-day examples, some key 
practical features of the landscape of contemporary moral philosophy and of a teleological understanding of virtues. 
14 For Martha Nussbaum’s championing of Aristotelian ethics through a literary perspective, see The Fragility of 
Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; first 
published 1986). For her specific interest in Dante, see, for example, her chapter on Dante in Upheavals of Thought: 
The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) pp. 557-590. Nussbaum has distanced 
herself, however, from what she considers the ‘antireason’ and ‘antitheory’ of MacIntyre: ‘in commending novels as 
cultivators of [...] an Aristotelian perception, I insisted that they would only yield ethical insight if read in connection 
with the systematic study of ethical theory’ (‘Preface to a revised edition’, in Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, p. 
xxvii).   
15 MacIntyre defines his own mature philosophical standpoint – ‘I write now with the intentions and commitments of a 
Thomistic Aristotelian’ – in Alasdair MacIntyre, The Tasks of Philosophy, Selected Essays, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. xi. For a useful survey and discussion of some key corroborating criticisms of 
MacIntyre’s project, and a bibliography, see Thomas D. D’Andrea, Tradition, Rationality, and Virtue: The Thought of 
Alasdair MacIntyre (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 403-34; 434-52.  
16 Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘How can we learn what Veritatis Splendor has to teach?’, in The Thomist, 58 (1994), pp. 171-
95; Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Truth as a good: a reflection on Fides et Ratio’, in MacIntyre, Tasks of Philosophy, I, pp. 197-
215.   
17 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals (London: Duckworth, 1999), p. x: ‘I now judge that I was in error 
in supposing an ethics independent of biology to be possible’. See also Intractable Disputes about the Natural Law. 
Alasdair MacIntyre and Critics, ed. by Lawrence S. Cunningham (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2009), 
pp. 1-52 and pp. 313-51. MacIntyre concludes the essay opening the volume (to which the other essays are responses) 
with the statement: ‘The best defence of natural law will consist in radical philosophical, moral, and cultural critques of 
rival standpoints’ (p. 52). 
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proofs in mathematics such that only ignorance would lead to error.18 MacIntyre’s standpoint is, 
nonetheless, alien to Dante for whom a correct understanding of human nature, a universal and 
timeless criterion, ontologically justifies moral values. As Dante’s eulogy of the pagan philosophers 
suggests, the most important claim of traditional philosophy is that it is semper eadem, for all men 
and for all times. With regard to Aristotelian ethics, Dante exclaims: ‘Qui ab Aristotile felicitatem 
ostensam reostendere conaretur?’19 The suggestion, then, that the task of each generation of 
philosophers is to remould an ethical theory such that it takes into account rival theories in an ever-
evolving tradition would not, I think, have occurred to him. 
 Beyond this narrative-genealogical bias, MacIntyre tends to imply that social context is not 
just a conduit for, but the origin of, moral value in se. MacIntyre presents the ‘tradition-version-of-
moral-enquiry’ as arising from particular social structures and enterprises which lent evaluative 
value to certain human strengths and capabilities.20 For Dante, however, social organisation is 
optimal when it serves as an effective conduit to human nature; a deficient society, in which false 
values reign, subjects and inhibits the natural potential of its citizens. Where MacIntyre 
characteristically proceeds, at the level of rhetoric, to ask ‘Whose Justice? Which Rationality’, for 
Dante ‘rationality’ refers to a thing – an intellectual faculty that human beings possess just as they 
possess the sensual faculty of sight.21 The word ‘rationality’ may be in need of etymological or 
epistemological clarification, but the thing ‘rationality’, for Dante, is ontologically grounded and 
does not require, as for MacIntyre, locating within a particular historical or sociological tradition.  
 It is difficult for MacIntyre to evade the accusation of working within the assumptions of the 
relativism he ostensibly attacks: MacIntyre’s ‘so-described particularism, his denial that a rationally 
                                                 
18 Although MacIntyre acknowledges the objection to his standpoint (‘might not its effect be to promote moral 
skepticism, to undermine belief in any moral standard?’), he considers this inevitable if we are to engage credibly with 
modern thinkers. As he puts it ‘if the precepts of natural law are indeed precepts established by reason, we should 
expect to find agreement in assenting to them among rational agents. But this is not what we find [...] Many intelligent, 
perceptive, and insightful agents either reject what Catholics take to be particular precepts of the natural law or accept 
them only in some very different version, or, more radically still, reject the very conception of a natural law. And these 
disagreements seem to be intractable’ (Intractable Disputes, pp. 1-2). For a perspective sympathetic to MacIntyre’s 
project but insistent on the rational basis of the Arisotelian-Thomist tradition, see, for example, Clifford G. Kossel, 
‘Natural Law and Human Law’, in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. by Stephen J. Pope (Washington: Georgetown University 
Press, 2002), pp. 167-93: ‘Alasdair MacIntyre has pointed out the disarray in many post-Enlightenment moral 
philosophies and the breakdown of traditions. But beyond appealing to an older tradition (Aristotelian-Thomist), one 
must show that this tradition has a sounder basis and can deal with the issues raised by modern moral philosophy and by 
life in large and diverse communities. This can be done only by returning in some way to human nature, not necessarily 
as antecedently known by speculative science, but as revealed in our natural knowledge of our natural inclinations. But 
this knowledge can, and for better understanding should, be related to the speculative knowledge of human nature and 
to the universal teleology of the universe and divine providence’ (p. 178). 
19 Dante, Monarchia, I.i. 4. 
20 The influence of MacIntyre’s early Marxism on the structure of this aspect of his thought is emphasised by D’Andrea 
who usefully highlights, in this context, MacIntyre’s 1995 Introduction to the reissuing of Marxism and Christianity. 
MacIntyre’s ‘rational ideology’ is a ‘successfully vindicated overall philosophical conception [...] or in MacIntyre’s 
words, “philosophy as a form of social practice embedded in and reflective upon other forms of social practice”’ 
(D’Andrea, p. 407). See also D’Andrea, pp. 87-122. 
21 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1988). 
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justifiable moral theory can speak to, and be persuasive for, any rational person beyond the bounds 
of the moral community of whose practice it is the theory’.22 Thomas D. D’Andrea has suggested, 
nonetheless, that the attack on MacIntyre’s relativism is ‘often enough inspired by a failure to 
distinguish what he says about rational moral persuasion from what he says about moral truth’.23 In 
this view, MacIntyre is not aiming for ‘moral truth’ but for an account of morality which is 
persuasive: the ‘appropriate goal [...] for MacIntyre is to have a good measure of rational 
confidence that one’s ethical beliefs and general moral outlook are true’.24 This displacement of 
‘persuasion’ for ‘truth’, however, only reinforces the relativity of the moral position. Indeed, 
D’Andrea proceeds to characterise MacIntyre’s ethical project by just the same historical and social 
contingency.25 
 For Dante, by contrast, there are three principal schools of philosophy – the Peripatetics, the 
Stoics, and the Epicureans – but his view of the ethical teaching of these schools stresses similarity 
rather than difference. The motives, or final goals, of the three schools may have been very 
different: the peripatetics placed ‘happiness’ as the highest good, the stoics ‘virtue’, the Epicureans 
‘pleasure’ (understood narrowly as ataraxia, a tranquillity of the soul free from pain). And yet, for 
Dante, each school nonetheless – in seeking its respective goal – taught and trained its disciples in 
virtue defined communally, in a nutshell, as the ordering of human action in accordance with 
reason. There is no room for moral relativism in Dante’s work because the criterion of natural ethics 
– reason – is not itself in question, as it is in modern ethics.  
 It is highly implausible, therefore, that Dante could have countenanced MacIntyre’s 
substitute for reason, the ‘historical imagination’:  
 
[...] is there then a single history of the world within which all other stories find their place and 
from which the significance of each subordinate story derives? Dante’s affirmative answer 
embodies a challenge to his future readers: tell me your story and I will show you that it only 
becomes intelligible within the framework provided by the Commedia.26  
 
Dante’s narrative does not, as MacIntyre suggests, include within it rival versions of moral enquiry. 
MacIntyre’s sweeping pronouncement about ‘Dante’s affirmative answer’ ignores, furthermore, the 
distinctions between natural and Christian ethics in the Commedia. The framework of the 
                                                 
22 D’Andrea, p. 403.  
23 Ibid., p. 404. 
24 Ibid., p. 404. D’Andrea compares this to Bernard Williams’ strategy, and the goal of ‘a rationally credible moral 
outlook’ (p. 405) 
25 ‘[MacIntyre] has always rejected the Cartesian-style portrayal about how its claims to universality are justifiable: they 
are justifiable, he holds, not by intuitable, self-justifying moral principles, but by dialectically discovered and 
hypothetico-deductively corroborated such principles [...] the process of reflective dialectical discovery of first 
principles is crucially affected by one’s prior moral habits and prior moral instruction in a nurturing and sustaining 
moral community’ (Ibid., p. 404).   
26 MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, pp. 144-45.  
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Commedia, after all, is Christian – it depicts the three realms of the Christian afterlife! Although, 
arguably, the moral structure of the Inferno may be understood principally in terms of natural law 
and the ethics of Aristotle (a reason-bound moral landscape), the Purgatory and Paradiso are 
emphatically revelation-bound moral landscapes. MacIntyre’s recourse to the Commedia as a whole 
to resolve philosophical considerations, therefore, is interpretatively unsustainable.  
 MacIntyre’s appeal to the master narrative of Dante’s Commedia may suggest, nonetheless, 
an implicit recourse to a Christian framework as a non-philosophical way out of the relativism of 
his philosophical position.27 It is, therefore, revealing that MacIntyre’s rhetoric is expanded by John 
Milbank with regard not to Dante’s Commedia but to theology ‘as a metadiscourse’ and that 
Graham Ward, without any reference to MacIntyre, should have characterised Milbank’s Theology 
and Social Theory as, indeed, a ‘contemporary Commedia’.28 Milbank, who ‘in contrast to most 
critiques of MacIntyre, [does] not find him sufficiently relativistic or historicist’, starts from 
MacIntyre’s premise, that ‘one must place oneself within a “narrative”, or the accepted and ever-to-
be-repeated “plot formation” of a particular society’.29 He then extrapolates from MacIntyre’s 
further position – that one version of moral enquiry may prevail over another because it includes, 
within its master narrative, its rivals – to apply to Christianity as the true master narrative or 
‘metadiscourse’. This leads to Milbank’s extraordinary claim that someone might assent to his 
genealogy of Christianity as, simply, the best story available: a rival moral view ‘cannot be refuted, 
but only out-narrated, if we can persuade people – for reasons of “literary taste” – that Christianity 
offers a better story’.30  
 Dante will not play the role which MacIntyre’s own philosophical-historical project assigns 
for him. Dante does not provide an ‘affirmative answer’, and certainly not in philosophical terms, to 
                                                 
27 In an earlier work, MacIntyre appeals to a Christian framework in the context of ‘different forms of moral 
vocabulary’ (anticipating rival versions of moral enquiry): ‘The distressing fact about our own society is that we are in 
just this situation: the effective and honest use of moral predicates does presuppose a shared moral vocabulary in an 
established moral community, but we do not as a whole community share a single moral vocabulary’ (Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Secularization and Moral Change (London: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1967), pp. 51-52). See also Ibid., p. 
75: ‘The inability of men to discard Christianity is part of their inability to provide any post-Christian means of 
understanding their situation in the world’.  
28 See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) and Graham 
Ward, ‘John Milbank’s Divina Commedia’, in New Blackfriars (June 1992), vol. 73, pp. 311-18 (p. 311). 
29 Milbank, p. 327; p. 339.  
30 Milbank, p. 330. For an anthology which questions the genealogy upon which Milbank’s position is based, see 
Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric and Truth, ed. by Wayne J. Hankey and Douglas 
Hedley (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). Graham Ward, however, uses the Commedia as an apology for Milbank’s 
methodological procedure and for the historical inaccuracies of his genealogy: ‘Analyses of individual secular thinkers 
and schools of thought only become meaningful within the movement of the whole book [...] Each analysis is 
subservient to this grand narrative. Because of this there emerges an element of distortion’ (Ward, p. 311). Ward 
appears to suggest that just as one might distinguish, say, the Statius of the Commedia (whom Dante presents as a secret 
convert to Christianity) from the Statius of history and yet still recognise the useful function of Dante’s Statius within 
the overarching narrative of the poem, so Milbank’s ‘Aquinas’ might serve a productive function in his metanarrative 
even though he may bear little resemblance to the Aquinas of history. See, John Marenbon ‘Aquinas, Radical 
Orthodoxy and the Importance of Truth’, in Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy, pp. 49-63: ‘The Aquinas of Radical 
Orthodoxy is a fine monument to the arbitrary power of postmodern hermeneutics: a totem, erected by Milbank and 
Pickstock for their own ideological purposes, which has almost nothing to do with the Aquinas of history’ (p. 63).  
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MacIntyre’s desire for a ‘single history of the world’ which will reconcile divergent versions of 
philosophical enquiry. Dante’s Commedia does not open a way out of what is, for MacIntyre, the 
philosophical incommensurability of modernity. Nor do appeals to Dante’s Commedia as a model 
for a theological-historical ‘metanarrative’ fare any better. All this notwithstanding, there is, I 
would argue, another way in which Dante’s Commedia presents ‘a challenge to his future readers’ 
and in which his poem confronts head on a philosophical view which would entirely undermine the 
very principle on which it is based. Moreover, this view – which Dante singles out as the heresy par 
excellence in his poem – is particularly striking as it underlies, arguably, a characteristic 
philosophical attitude of secular modernity.  
 
 
A Medieval Poet and Modernity 
 
Having passed through the circles of upper hell where incontinent sin (lust, gluttony, avarice and 
prodigality, anger) is punished, Dante and Virgil enter the City of Dis where malice (deliberate evil) 
is punished. They are immediately confronted by a huge graveyard of burning open tombs: these 
are, Dante learns, the tombs of the heretics of all different sects. Dante and Virgil then enter, by a 
secret path, that part of this burning graveyard where ‘Epicurus and his disciples who make the soul 
die with the body’ reside.31  
 The presence of Epicurus and his sect is deeply surprising. Kenelm Foster asks ‘Why then 
Epicurus? Why the special stress, implied in the poet’s deliberately choosing to cross the circle of 
heresy at precisely that point, on the evil of denying the soul’s survival of bodily death?’32 There 
were, after all, far more obvious ‘Christian’ heresies such as the denial of Christ’s human or divine 
nature or forms of body-soul dualism (Manichaeism or Albigensianism). And yet, the whole canto 
of the heretics (Inferno X) is devoted to one heresy of pagan origin: the denial of the soul’s survival 
of bodily death. Dante’s emphasis on Epicureanism is certainly surprising, but it is also prophetic. 
Had Dante chosen to focus on, say, Arianism, his modern secular reader could have read the 
passage with the detached curiosity of an historian of Christianity or antiquarian. But Dante’s 
emphasis on Epicureanism does embody, in MacIntyre’s terms, ‘a challenge to his future readers’. 
If the great summa of Dante’s poem, like the great gothic cathedrals of his time, may appear 
wonderful but alien (as it did to the critic I.A. Richards), does not the twenty-first-century reader 
                                                 
31 Inferno, X. 14-15: ‘hanno da questa parte con Epicuro / tutti i suoi seguaci che l’anima col corpo morta fanno’.  
32 Kenelm Foster, The Two Dantes and Other Studies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), 
p. 11.  
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nonetheless discover a strange kinship with the views of the Epicureans therein represented?33 For, 
prima facie at least, an outlook concerned only with this life is, also, a dominant feature of secular 
modernity. What, then, does Dante mean by Epicureanism and how might his account provide a 
parallel with philosophical attitudes underlying modernity?34  
 The first perplexing thing for a modern reader is that Dante’s Epicurus is presented as a 
heretic at all. Surely only a baptised Christian could be a heretic?35 Authoritative theologians, such 
as Augustine and Aquinas, had considered that heresy may involve error with regard to the goal of 
life and not only errors with regard explicitly to the revealed dogmas of Christian faith.36 
Nonetheless, the point was that these errors (even if pagan in origin) were held obstinately against 
the authority of church teaching. By classing Epicurus as a heretic, Dante seems to suggest that 
Epicurus trespassed against not ecclesial but philosophical authority. Thus, although Democritus 
held the same atomistic view of the human soul as Epicurus, he is classed by Dante not as a heretic 
but as a virtuous pagan.37 Epicurus is a heretic, in other words, not simply because he shared with 
Democritus a mistaken atomistic view of the human soul, but because he persevered in it even after 
Aristotle (the authority in philosophy: ‘il maestro di color che sanno’) had set forth and confuted 
Democritus in De Anima.38 Epicurus’ heresy involves a philosophical error and an affront to the 
philosophical authority of Aristotle. To deviate from Aristotle in philosophy is, for Dante it seems, 
a form of philosophical heresy!  
                                                 
33 Robin Kirkpatrick cites I. A. Richards’ impassioned perplexity ‘in the face of a work which he admits to be a 
masterpiece: “Minds that accept, totally or in part, the concepts of the cosmos set forth in the Commedia and minds that 
reject them totally, how can they sufficiently read alike a poem so unified and precise. [...] how can a poem so 
dependent on such principles be read by those who think them among the most pernicious aberrations that men have 
suffered?”’. See Kirkpatrick, Difficult and Dead Poetry, pp. 1-2; see also I. A. Richards, Beyond (New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich. 1974), pp. 107-8. 
34 The prominence given to Epicurus by Dante has led to a number of articles within Dante studies. For a bibliography, 
see George Corbett, Dante and Epicurus: A Dualistic Vision of Secular and Spiritual Fulfilment (Oxford: Legenda, 
2013), p. 4, n. 1. The more general reception of Epicurus in the medieval period has been under treated by medievalists 
and historians of philosophy. For example, Howard Jones, documenting the history of Epicureanism, tellingly entitles 
the medieval chapter ‘Medieval Interlude’ (Howard Jones, The Epicurean Tradition (London: Routledge,1989), pp.117-
41). Two recent exceptions, however, are John Marenbon’s important study ‘The Hellenistic Schools and Thinking 
about Pagan Philosophy in the Middle Ages’ (Basel: Schwabe, 2013) and Aurélien Robert’s article, ‘Épicure et les 
épicuriens au Moyen Âge’, in Micrologus xxi (2013), pp. 3-46.  
35 The Epicureans are, Kenelm Foster concludes, ‘not even, theologically speaking, heretics at all but unbelievers; for in 
strict theology a heretic is still a sort of Christian’ (Foster, The Two Dantes, p. 11).  
36 Thus, according to Aquinas who explicitly cites the Stoics and the Epicureans in his example, he who errs as to the 
goal of life (‘finis vitae humanae’), just as he who errs with regard to the Christian faith, is a heretic: ‘Si vero erraret 
circa ea quae sunt ad finem vitae humane, semper est haereticus. Et dico finem vitae humanae, quia apud antiquos erant 
sectae ponentes diversum finem, ut patet de Stoicis et Epicureis’ (Aquinas, Super Epistolam Beati Pauli ad Titum 
lectura, cap. 3, l. 2). Augustine similarly cites the Epicurean and Stoic schools as heresies: see Augustine, Contra 
Cresconium grammaticum donatistam, I. 12. 15 and Epistola, LXXXV. 10. 
37 Dante, Inferno, IV. 136: ‘Democrito che ‘l mondo a caso pone’.  
38 Dante, Inferno, IV. 131. For a summary of other interpretative approaches to the problem of Dante’s contrasting 
treatment of Epicurus (a heretic in Inferno, X) and Democritus (a virtuous pagan in Inferno, IV), see Valerio Lucchesi, 
‘Epicurus and Democritus: The Ciceronian Foundations of Dante’s Judgement’, Italian Studies, 42 (1987), pp. 1-19 (pp. 
14-19). 
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 It seems correct, therefore, to affirm that the followers of Epicurus in Inferno X are not 
‘heretics’ in the conventional sense (as those who hold some of the truths of the Christian faith but 
deny others) but, rather, unbelievers who, for philosophical reasons, deny the revealed truths of 
faith tout court. After all, Epicurean mortalism is entirely incompatible with Christian faith and, 
indeed, with the literal and moral ground of the Commedia. The poem’s literal subject is the state of 
human souls after death while, for the Epicureans, there is no afterlife. The moral subject is man 
who may elect good or evil in this life and will thereby be rewarded or punished by God for the 
eternity of the next life. The Epicurean canto, which is set in a graveyard, is clearly intended as a 
memento mori. Ironically, however, it was precisely the fear of death and of God’s final judgement 
from which Epicurean philosophy sought to liberate mankind. As Edward Moore suggests, Dante 
refers ‘not so much to what we understand by “heresy” as to open and professed infidelity, and this 
particularly in its aspect of Materialism’.39 
 This brings us to the second thing which may surprise modern readers about Dante’s 
Epicurus and his followers in the circle of the heretics. One might think that Epicurus is being held 
up by Dante as the heretic par excellence because he pursued and encouraged a life of pleasure. If 
Epicurus the sensual hedonist is being condemned, modern secular readers – if just reasonably 
abstemious – might think themselves off the hook! But this is not the case. The materialist who, 
unrestrained by the moral influence of religion, lives a bestial life of the senses is given a place in 
Dante’s Inferno but he does not merit the epithet (or rather epitaph) ‘Epicurean’. Indeed Dante 
polemically corrects the false, but widespread, medieval view of Epicurus as little better than a pig 
enslaved to the senses (the porcus de grege Epicuri), a figure he caricatures in the glutton Ciacco 
(Inferno VI).40 Dante’s treatment, by contrast, reflects a more sophisticated strand of the medieval 
reception which, although condemning Epicurus’ natural philosophy, nonetheless understood 
Epicurus to have taught virtue in moral philosophy.41 The mantra ‘Let us eat and drink, for 
tomorrow we shall die’ is foolish – and should not be attributed to any philosophical school – 
because such a life is, to use Dante’s metaphors, a living death, a sleep, or an animal life. Man is, 
uniquely, a rational animal and, therefore, he only lives as a man insofar as he lives in accordance 
with reason. The Epicurean secular life – based upon a conviction of man’s mortality – does not 
imply, therefore, depraved sensuality. 
 Dante uses the appellation ‘Epicurean’ to refer, in a general way, to all those who live in 
accordance with the teachings of moral philosophy but who, due to an intellectual conviction of 
                                                 
39 Edward Moore, Studies in Dante, Second series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 178.  
40 See Simone Marchesi ‘“Epicuri de grege porcus”: Ciacco, Epicurus and Isidore of Seville’, Dante Studies, 117 
(1999), pp. 117-31. For a development of this thesis, see Corbett, Dante and Epicurus, pp. 27-33. Corbett underlines 
that Dante, despite setting up this unmistakable parallel, at no point labels Ciacco as an Epicurean: ‘Ciacco is a porcus 
(he is the personality-type defined by Isidore) but he emphatically is not, for Dante, ‘de grege Epicuri’ (p. 32).  
41 See Marenbon, The Hellenistic Schools,  pp. 6-39 and Robert, ‘Épicure et les épicuriens’, pp. 3-46.   
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mortalism, reject Christian faith.42 Thus, the followers of Epicurus depicted in Inferno X, although 
denying Christian faith, are all ‘great-souled’ nobles (‘magnanimi’). In the context of an intellectual 
period during which neo-Aristotelian scholars sought to mediate between the order of nature and 
the order of grace, and between the patrimony of the pagan philosophers (principally of Aristotle) 
and the body of Christian revelation, Dante argued that man has two ethical goals which correspond 
to these two orders: a natural happiness potentially attainable in this life through the teachings of 
the philosophers, and an eternal beatitude attainable only through the teachings of the Christian 
faith. Dante’s Epicurean thereby provides the theoretical framework for what we might call today 
‘secular man’, committed to this world and the attainment of earthly felicity but unconcerned with 
or indifferent to religion of an afterlife.  
  Modern secular unbelievers, therefore, might like to seek out their distant intellectual 
ancestors in Dante’s graveyard of the Epicureans. But they must be wary of flattering themselves by 
the comparison. After all, many of our secular contemporaries have rejected not only, in common 
with Dante’s Epicureans, the immortality of the soul and the dogmas of the Christian faith but also, 
in contrast to the Epicureans presented in Inferno X, the ethics and philosophy which direct man 
towards a this-worldly happiness. It is only too easy to witness today the disordered pursuit of 
sensual gratification, from depraved excesses (the pig-Epicurean) to more sophisticated tastes (the 
modern day ‘Epicure’). This is as much a characteristic of early twenty-first-century Western 
society as it appears to have been a feature of early fourteenth-century Christendom. But rather less 
widespread, in the early twenty-first century, is the conviction, amongst secular unbelievers, that it 
behoves them – qua human beings – to pursue, and to exhort others to pursue, the life of virtue. For, 
in the era of modernity – after a philosophical cataclysm which MacIntyre crudely locates in the 
eighteenth-century enlightenment abandonment of Aristotelianism – reason and natural ethics are 
themselves in question.43  
 Dante’s representation of the Epicureans nonetheless presents two key challenges to a 
modern secular reader. First, it denies him or her the opportunity to stand entirely outside the 
Commedia, as outside a museum of antiquities which have no bearing on modernity. Dante’s 
emphasis on Epicureanism belies any simplistic depiction of the medieval era as an ‘age of faith’ in 
                                                 
42 For a survey of four literary fields of influence – the Roman writers, the medieval encyclopaedias, the patristic and 
popular traditions, and the scholastic treatment – which may have informed Dante’s understanding of Epicureanism, see 
Corbett, Dante and Epicurus, pp. 8-18 (with notes, pp. 33-37). Some of these sources include quite sophisticated 
accounts of Epicurean ethics. Dante does not seem to have been concerned, however, with the actual content of 
Epicurus’ ethics. Rather ‘Epicurean’ serves as a more general tag to denote someone who pursues an ethical life but 
with no thought to the afterlife.  
43 In the famous opening chapter ‘A Disquieting Suggestion’ of After Virtue (1970), MacIntyre compares the modern 
state of philosophy with an imagined future in which, after ‘a series of environmental disasters blamed by the general 
public on the scientists’, a ‘Know-Nothing’ revolution successfully abolishes scientific knowledge leaving only 
‘fragments’ of a system for future generations to revive: ‘bits and pieces of theory [...] instruments whose use has been 
forgotten [...] very partial knowledge of each’ (MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 1). 
  
12 
which, before the advent of modern science, people in Western Europe unanimously subscribed 
unquestionably to the tenets of the Christian faith. We may note, indeed, that many of the principal 
philosophical views of the Epicureans find their direct parallels in the standard tenets of dominant 
forms of modern thought: materialism; atomism; mortalism; implicit atheism; the rejection of all 
forms of religion; the denial of Creation and of Divine Providence; a version of ethics founded upon 
a prudential pleasure principle. Indeed, the mechanistic philosophy characteristic of the modern age 
presupposes, more or less self-consciously, premises shared with Epicurean teaching. Beyond an 
analogical parallel, scholars have even traced macro-intellectual genealogies from Aristotelian 
ontology to an Epicurean-inspired materialism, the seventeenth-century scientific revolution, and 
the intellectual landscape of modernity.44 It is thus of particular interest that Dante responds to this 
incipient materialism, mortalism, and implicit atheism at a crucial philosophical juncture in western 
thought, at arguably the very height of European scholasticism and medieval Christendom.45 
Although the modern reader may have different reasons, scientific or otherwise, for holding such 
views, Dante’s familiarity with them may challenge the unbelieving reader into a constructive 
dialogue with the Christian poet.  
 Secondly, Dante’s poem presents a stringent ethical challenge to those who are convinced 
unbelievers. This is a challenge exemplified by a story in Boccaccio’s Decameron which builds 
upon Dante’s presentation of the Epicureans. A group of Florentine signori, given to a life of 
pleasure, accost the Florentine poet-philosopher Guido Cavalcanti in the graveyard of St Reparata. 
They ask him what he will do when, following the opinion of Epicurus, he has finally proven that 
God does not exist. Guido replies obliquely that the signori can say in their house whatever they 
like. Only the signori’s leader, Betto Bruneschelli, understands Guido’s meaning. The graveyard is 
the house of the dead and the signori, pursuing a hedonistic lifestyle, are worse than dead men. 
While he may not believe in a life after death, Guido – living a virtuous and philosophical life – is 
alive as a man before death. Whether or not they believe in life after death, these signori – living 
the life of the senses – are, by contrast, dead as men (rational animals) even before their death as 
sentient beings. The second challenge, therefore, is to live fully the ethical life of reason, whether 
Christian believer or not, which is the only kind of life worthy of being called human. This is the 
                                                 
44 Catherine Wilson, Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008) and Catherine Wilson 
‘Epicureanism in early modern philosophy’ in The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, ed. by James Warren 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp.266-86. Jacques Maritain, in his history of philosophy, similarly 
highlights the rejection of hylomorphism as the defining characteristic of mechanistic philosophy: ‘mechanists – 
whether in their doctrine of the human soul they are materialists (Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius, among the ancients, 
Hobbes in the seventeenth century, etc.) or spiritualists like Descartes – reduce corporeal substance to matter’. 
Mechanistic philosophy attempts ‘to explain all things mechanically, that is to say as the result of a simple aggregation 
of material elements effected by local motion’. However, it is clear that – for Maritain at least – this rejection of 
hylomorphism and the adoption of a narrow mechanistic worldview is not altogether a good thing! See Jacques 
Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2005), p. 102; p. 21. 
45 Maritain comments that ‘nothing less than age-old Christendom was singing its last song in Dante’ (Jacques Maritain, 
Creative Intuition in art and poetry (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953), p. 383. 
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necessary criterion, alongside being an unbeliever, to join that exclusive band of proto-laici who 
occupy the graveyard of the Epicureans in Dante’s depiction of the afterlife!  
 
 At this point, a reader might reasonably object: but, of course, not all modern readers of 
Dante’s poem are secular non-believers. Indeed, less than a hundred years ago, on the six-hundredth 
anniversary of Dante’s death in 1921, Pope Benedict XV could even proclaim:   
 
Dante lived in an age which inherited the most glorious fruits of philosophical and theological 
teaching and thought, and handed them on to the succeeding ages with the imprint of the strict 
scholastic method [...] though he is separated from us by centuries, he has still the freshness of a 
poet of our times.46 
 
Pope Benedict XV’s statement undeniably reflects a tendency of his time to read Dante’s 
Commedia as distilling the wisdom of the great age of scholasticism (as, more crudely, Aquinas in 
verse), a tendency which may elide the range of Dante’s sources and the striking individuality of 
aspects of his own thinking.47 It is nonetheless easy to imagine how, for someone brought up within 
the intellectual tradition of Thomism, Dante might have ‘the freshness of a poet of our times’.48 
Dante’s emphasis, meanwhile, on the relative autonomy of philosophy and theology was appealing 
to a catholic culture which sought a convincing response to the opposing philosophical currents of 
modernity in the philosophical tradition of the scholastics (and principally in its championing of 
Aquinas). There is a sense in which Dante, as a poet writing at the height of medieval scholasticism, 
does pass on ‘the most glorious fruits of philosophical and theological teaching and thought’ and, 
for anyone committed to this tradition, his poem is an insightful introduction (even where certain 
elements of his thought deviate from what would become Roman orthodoxy in Thomism).  
 For Dante to have the ‘freshness of a poet of our times’, however, for Dante to present, in 
MacIntyre’s words, ‘a challenge to his future readers’, he must also speak philosophically to those 
who have neither Aristotelian nor Christian commitments at all. Alongside Pope Benedict XV’s 
championing of Dante in his anniversary year, 1921 also saw the translation into English of a new 
catechism of the Summa Theologiae.49 In the preface, Pope Benedict XV reiterates his conviction 
that ‘the manifold honours paid by the Holy See to St Thomas Aquinas exclude for ever any doubt 
                                                 
46 Pope Benedict XV, Encyclical Letter, ‘In Praeclara Summorum’ (Rome, April 30th, 1921), par. 4 and 9. 
47 For the most recent appraisal of the Dante-Aquinas relationship, and its history in Dante scholarship, see Simon A. 
Gilson ‘Dante and Christian Aristotelianism’, in Reviewing Dante’s Theology, ed. by Claire Honess and Matthew 
Treherne (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2013), pp. 65-110. 
48 Marking the Dante sexcentenary in New Blackfriars, J.F. Makepeace exhibits at once the connaturality of Dante’s 
work to an intellectual life informed by catholicism and the concomitant tendency to over-simplify Dante’s thought (as, 
in this case, a simple mouth-piece for the ‘catholic standpoint’). See J.F. Makepeace ‘The Dante Sexcentenary’, in New 
Blackfriars (1921), 2, pp. 92-97.  
49 R.P. Thomas Pègues, Catechism of the Summa Theologica of Saint Thomas Aquinas, trans. by Ælred Whitacre, OP 
(Chorley: Christian Books Today, 2009). Whitacre’s preface is dated 6th December, 1921. Benedict XV’s preface to the 
work, appended to the French and English editions, was given on 5th February, 1919.  
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from the mind of Catholics with regard to his being raised up by God as the Master of Doctrine to 
be followed by the Church through all ages’.50 Notably, in the catechism’s presentation of Aquinas’ 
discussion of Justice and the sin of ‘irreligion’, the author adds the question: ‘Under what special 
form does the latter exist at the present day?’, to which he answers ‘Under the form of what may be 
called secularism [...] that system in which God is put out of one’s life completely’.51 Today, he 
suggests, ‘there is no more pressing duty than to combat secularism by all the means in one’s 
power’.52 Almost a hundred years on, secularism has become ever more the attitude of ‘our times’. 
Although the analogue is imprecise, it seems appropriate to highlight, therefore, Dante’s strange but 
prophetic emphasis on the Epicureans. 
                                                 
50 Pègues, p. v 
51 Pègues, pp. 173-74.   
52 Pègues, p. 174.  
